By OkayGoal
Losing to a promoted side on the opening weekend is a horrific result for Manchester United, but a closer look at the tactics reveals exactly why Hull City were able to cause so many defensive problems with only 29% of the ball. It gives us a genuine glimpse of what Michael Carrick might be building in attack.
United (both deep and high up the pitch) were looking to defend in a 4-4-2. With Fernandez alongside Cunha up front, and that is where when you might have expected United to come out pressing high, Carrick & Co. actually did the opposite. Whenever possible, they tried to remain solid using the front two to tie up Hull’s pivots while giving their own midfield pair the freedom to patrol the central zone.
Hull baited Manchester United’s press with a back three
Hull were excellent at baiting the press, holding onto the ball until United were forced to come towards them. This is where shape mattered most. Deeper on the pitch, Hull could form a back three with the goalkeeper as the third man, but more often it was a traditional back three within their 3-4-3 shape. This directly impacted United’s wingers.
If the front two were dragged into a high press but the midfield force stayed put, it would be far too easy for one of the wider centre-backs to act as the outlet and progress up the pitch. Not only did United’s midfield pair have to back up the press, the ball-side winger had to make a decision on whether to press too.
Initially, in the case of Dorgu, the decision was to press leaving United effectively in a lopsided 4-3-3. But with the midfield tied up and unable to assist out wide, it could lead to disastrous defensive situations as the whole wing-back received the ball with both space and numbers ahead of him. There was a clear example of United trying to hold a mid-block with Dorgu drawn into the press. This time a midfielder was rotating into a wing-back position, but the result was the same: time on the ball to progress up the pitch, and within two passes Hull were in the final third which eventually lead to a dangerous cross.
This was not a one-off. Having been stung once, Dorgu could be found in no man’s land again. He was beginning to be drawn towards a third man while knowing he was leaving Shaw at risk. Though the pass in question did not come off, the risk was visible. Shaw was potentially facing a two-versus-one against the wing-back and attacking midfielder. So as a domino, Ayden Heaven was drawn out of his central zones to compensate.
How Manchester United could have solved the pressing problem
There are different ways of dealing with this kind of build-up structure from a 4-4-2 base besides simply sitting off entirely.
One of the most common is deliberately funnelling play into one direction, with the front two pressing strategically and using their angles to cut off passing options to one side. That would mean when Dorgu began to press, there was only one region the opposition could safely play into and because of those limited options, the wide area could function as a genuine pressing trap with the back line shifting across to apply pressure onto the receiving wing-back proactively rather than arriving a second late.
Alternatively, United could have looked to apply pressure earlier. One of the issues was that the wider centre-back had time to receive and face play before pressure arrived. Imagine instead a scenario where the side commits to pressing and Dorgu’s press arrives just as the man is receiving the ball. It would be so much harder for Hull’s wider centre-back to play out having had no time to look up and assess his options.
Manchester United’s approach in possession
The bulk of the play, of course, came with United on the ball, and it told us a lot about Carrick’s approach for the upcoming season.
United’s average positions were, by design, hard to discern much from, as the side deliberately looked to build with a back three in case Hull pressed with their front two, achieved through either pivot dropping in, though for the most part it was Mazraoui tucking in early on.
United’s approach against Hull’s shape positioned them well to take advantage of both the wide areas and the central channels.
It all started and ended with United’s desire for overloads. As much as possible, when higher up the pitch, United looked to build with Santos as the solo pivot which was made easier by Hull sitting deeper.
Crucially, with Shaw almost always pushing up outside Dorgu in the first half, the winger would come infield, while Tielemans pushed into the right-hand half-space, almost in line with the front two. But when these inside players pushed high, it was easier for Hull to deal with the threat given their back five, with the centre-backs relatively close to the attackers and comfortable stepping out knowing they had cover behind.
The double false nine that made Manchester United dangerous
United looked most dangerous when they shifted focus from overloading the final line to overloading the midfield line instead. It was made possible by effectively operating with a double false nine, as Cunha and Fernandez were constantly alternating positions or both coming deep into midfield regions. This was a theme throughout the 90 minutes with all the central players highly fluid which explains the scattered average positions.
This is where United’s upgraded midfield should bear fruit over the season.
Where last season it would have been Bruno sacrificing his own creativity to make this work, Santos and Tielemans in particular were able to thread line-breaking passes into the men between the lines, as Hull struggled to deal with the sheer numbers in the central region. This overload grew as United chased the match, with Mazraoui now providing width on the right which time and again allowed Mbeumo to join the central overload.
With these two men preferring to drop deep, it fell to Dorgu or others to occupy the centre-backs and stop them from pushing out with dynamic runs in behind crucial as United were not afraid to go more direct with passes in behind.
The result was not just multiple line-breaking opportunities, but a midfield with close proximity in the central zone. This ended up unlocking real combination play. United started repeatedly to get into good positions but they could not make it count.
Naturally, the overloads forced Hull to defend more compactly (mainly in a 5-4-1) and United looked to immediately switch to wide overloads especially down the right, again with Tielemans pushing into wider areas, forcing Hull to drag their midfield across to deal with the threat.
Manchester United’s box overloads went unrewarded
This is where Dorgu’s dynamism came in handy.
Despite Hull having a back five that could theoretically cover the width, his arrowing runs meant the right wing-back often found himself sucked narrow, leaving space out wide for Shaw to receive the switch.
Carrick’s other pillar came to the fore here too, as constant box overloads meant the full-back always had men to hit, usually at least four crashing the box.
Plenty of dangerous situations emerged which were not maximised. Despite second-half changes, the general strategy from Carrick remained the same, and on a different day, perhaps it would have paid off. Speaking about their performance vs Hull particularly, United finished with almost 2 xG and nothing to show for it.
Author Opinion
It is fair to say this was far from an ideal start for United. But in possession there were genuine positive signs for what might come further down the line as the side continues to gel. The defensive framework needs urgent attention, but the attacking patterns on show suggest Carrick’s blueprint has real potential once the personnel settle in.